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This paper analyzes empirically a public policy promoting industrial clusters in France. Cluster policies have
become popular in many countries but have not been extensively evaluated.We propose in this paper the ﬁrst
quantitative evaluation of a cluster policy exploiting ﬁrm-level data. We use data on production and
employment for ﬁrms that beneﬁted from the policy and on ﬁrms that did not, both before and after the policy
started. We ﬁrst show that the policy selected ﬁrms in sectors and regions in relative decline. Second, the
policy did not succeed in reversing the relative decline in productivity for the targeted ﬁrms. The policy had no
robust effect on employment or exports.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Industrial clusters are popular amongpolicymakers. Since the end of
the 1980s, national and local governments in Germany, Brazil, Japan,
South Korea, the Spanish Basque country, and France, inter alia, have
attempted to foster their development. The work by Michael Porter
(1998, 2000), the leading ﬁgure of cluster strategies, has been very
inﬂuential in this matter and is invariably used as a justiﬁcation for
cluster policies. Very large amounts ofmoney are often spent on clusters
initiatives (1.5 billion euros for the French “competitiveness clusters”
from 2006 to 2008 and from 2009 to 2011, 45 billion euros for the
“Northwest Regional Economic Strategy” from 2006 to 2026 in UK for
example). There is however surprisingly little macro ormicro empirical
analysis of their effect on ﬁrms' performance. The present paper
attempts to ﬁll this gap. To our knowledge, it is the ﬁrst one to analyze
quantitatively the effect, on individual ﬁrms, of a speciﬁc cluster policy.
A typical defense of cluster policies is that clusters bring economic
gains and should therefore receive public support. Porter's deﬁnition
of a cluster – “a geographically proximate group of interconnected
companies and associated institutions in a particular ﬁeld, linked by
commonalities and complementarities” – is not very far from what
economists call an agglomeration. The idea that clusters bring
economic gains because ﬁrms perform better when located near
other ﬁrms in the same sector is hardly new. In the late nineteenth
century, Alfred Marshall identiﬁed several beneﬁts of clusters or
industrial districts. The different sources of agglomeration external-
ities were ﬁrst analyzed by Marshall and later rediscovered by
Kenneth Arrow and Paul Romer. Those are 1) input externalities that
save on transportation costs and make inputs purchases more
efﬁcient; 2) labour market externalities that foster the creation of
pools of specialized workers, who acquire cluster-speciﬁc skills
valuable to the ﬁrms; 3) knowledge externalities through which
industrial clusters facilitate the exchange of information and
knowledge.
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Advocates of cluster policies need to address three questions:
1. How large are the gains from agglomeration? In particular, how
much does the productivity of a ﬁrm increase when other ﬁrms
from the same sector decide to locate nearby?
2. Do ﬁrms internalize these gains when making their location
decisions? In particular, are “natural” clusters too small?
3. Can public policies that attempt to foster clusters affect positively
the performance of the ﬁrms that belong to those clusters?
There is a large empirical literature that has attempted to answer
the ﬁrst question. The survey of Rosenthal and Strange (2004) reports
that in the many empirical studies on agglomeration, the doubling of
the size of a cluster (generally measured as employment of a given
sector in a given region or as local density of employment) leads to a
productivity gain between 3% and 8%. In another paper on French
ﬁrm-level data, (Martin et al., forthcoming), we estimate this
elasticity to be around 5% while Combes et al. (2008) ﬁnd an elasticity
of French individual wages to local density of around 3%. The starting
point of those who defend cluster strategies is thus right: economic
gains from clusters exist. Their enthusiasm should however be tamed;
these effects are modest. In Martin et al. (forthcoming), we also ﬁnd
evidence that French ﬁrms internalize part of these productivity gains
when they choose where to locate: the size of existing “natural”
clusters is not very different from the size that wouldmaximize, in the
short-run, productivity gains.1 Hence, the case for public intervention
in favor of clusters can be made but there is no evidence that the
expected gains should be large.
Finally, even if one assumes that there is a case for public
intervention (gains from clusters exist and there are not entirely
internalized by ﬁrms), there is little evidence on the answer to the
third question. Can cluster policies actually help? The present paper is
to our knowledge the ﬁrst one to focus on this question using ﬁrm-
level data.
Cluster policies could do so in twoways. First, cluster policies could
increase the size of existing clusters and thus improve the perfor-
mance of ﬁrms if the cluster size is suboptimally small. Second, for a
given size of clusters, cluster policies could improve the workings of
externalities (input market externalities, labour market externalities
and technological externalities). Both mechanisms could increase
productivity of ﬁrms in the cluster (see Duranton et al., forthcoming
for a broader discussion of these issues).
In this paper, we exploit a rich French ﬁrm-level dataset to analyze
the impact of a speciﬁc cluster policy that was implemented in 1999,
by the Délégation interministérielle à l'Aménagement du Territoire et
à l'Attractivité Régionale (Datar), the French administration in charge
of spatial planning and regional policy. The policy provided support to
groups of ﬁrms, located in the same area and belonging to the same
industry, called the “Local Productive Systems” (LPS). The main aim of
the policy was to encourage cooperation among ﬁrms and to increase
the competitiveness of ﬁrms in the cluster. From this point of view,
the objective of the LPS policy was to improve the performance of
ﬁrms in the cluster without necessarily aiming at increasing its size.
We assess the impact of public support to LPS on several
dimensions of ﬁrm-level performance (TFP, employment, exports).
We use several evaluation techniques (difference-in-difference, triple
differences and matching) on a ﬁrm-level detailed dataset that spans
over the 1996–2004 period, during which a subsample of ﬁrms were
selected to beneﬁt from the policy. We also investigate the existence
of potential externalities of the policy by running the analysis at the
area and industry level, and not only at the ﬁrm level.
We ﬁrst analyze the characteristics of “treated” ﬁrms. This is
interesting because it raises important political economy issues. Our
results show clearly that the French LPS policy targeted ﬁrms located
in backward regions and operating in declining industries. Hence, the
policy turned out to be of a defensive type. The ofﬁcial objective was
to promote agglomeration externalities and clusters dynamics and
was supposed to mark a radical shift of the French regional policy,
from traditional spatial equity to efﬁciency considerations. Our results
suggest that the traditional equity objectivewas in reality still at play.2
We also ﬁnd that LPS ﬁrms receive on average more public subsidies
than the others. This is consistent with the study by Beason and
Weinstein (1996) on Japan. They show that the reality of Japanese
industrial policies implemented between 1955 and 1990 clashed with
the ofﬁcial objective to help the growth of winners. Indeed, they ﬁnd a
negative correlation between the growth of a given industry and the
intensity of the aid it received. Our results on the French cluster policy
we have studied as well as those of Beason and Weinstein (1996) are
consistent with two interpretations. One is that subsidies to declining
industries reveal government political preferences (Corden, 1974,
Krueger, 1990). Another possible mechanism is provided by Baldwin
and Robert-Nicoud (2007). These authors show that governments
often “pick losers”, or more exactly that public subsidies are captured
by declining ﬁrms because these latter have a greater incentive to
lobby for subsidies.
We also ﬁnd that the French cluster policy was unable to reverse
the relative decline of TFP at work for ﬁrms selected by the policy. We
ﬁnd no effect on employment or on exports. At the area-industry
level, an effect is detected on exports, but its statistical signiﬁcance
and magnitude strongly depend on the speciﬁcation. No signiﬁcant
effect is detected on survival.
Criscuolo et al. (2007) ﬁnd that the Regional Selective Assistance in
UK, designed to subsidize ﬁrms in backward areas, has had a positive
impact on ﬁrms' employment and investment but no effect on ﬁrms'
productivity. By supporting less efﬁcient ﬁrms, the authors judge that
such a policy may slow down reallocations from less efﬁcient plants
and affect negatively aggregate productivity growth.
A more positive conclusion is reached by Branstetter and
Sakakibara (2002) who analyze Japanese R&D public policy and its
effect on the patenting activity of ﬁrms involved in government-
sponsored research consortia. They ﬁnd a positive impact, though
quite small when all controls are included. Their method, which
consists in examining the relative patenting path of consortia ﬁrms
the years after the inception of the consortium, is close to ours.
A related literature has analyzed the effect of subsidies given to
ﬁrms to locate in speciﬁc regions. Crozet et al. (2004) study for
example the determinants of location choice by foreign investors in
France over the period 1985–1995. They measure the impact of a
French subsidy (the “Prime d'Aménagement du Territoire”, PAT) and
of European grants for regional policy on ﬁrms' location choice. They
ﬁnd a generally positive, but very weak and hardly signiﬁcant effect of
those policies. Devereux et al. (2007) study the effect of Regional
Selective Assistance (RSA) grants on the ﬁrms’ location in United
Kingdom.3 They also ﬁnd a positive but very weak effect of the policy.
Head et al. (1999) analyze the effect of state level policies in United
States to attract Japanese ﬁrms and ﬁnd that the probability to attract
these ﬁrms increases with the subsidies. However, given that all states
have such policies, the location of ﬁrms is not affected in equilibrium.
Finally, Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007) ﬁnd that “enterprize zones”,
which are programs in the US aimed at encouraging business in
speciﬁc areas, have no impact either on employment or on activity.
This is due to a higher growth rate of new ﬁrms compensated by a
higher rate of failures.
1 The estimated positive elasticities in the literature, taken literally, would suggest
that larger clusters are always better. In fact, exploiting annual variations of variables,
we ﬁnd that productivity gains ﬁrst increase and then decrease (due to congestion
costs) with the size of clusters, allowing us to estimate an optimal size of the cluster.
2 An additional indication of that spatial equity objective is that the LPS projects are
relatively evenly spread out on the national territory.
3 Which is very similar to the French PAT.
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The paper is structured as follows. We ﬁrst describe in Section 2
the Local Productive Systems policy and our data. We then lay out in
Section 2.5 our empirical strategy. We present our results in Section 3
and some robustness checks in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. What are the “Local Productive Systems”?
2.1. The policy
The French agency in charge of regional policy (Datar) issued in
1998 a tender intended to fund collaborative projects between ﬁrms
of a given industry located in the same area. The purpose was clearly
to promote agglomeration externalities and clusters dynamics. This
policy corresponds to a quite radical shift in the objectives of French
regional policy, from traditional spatial equity to taking more into
account efﬁciency considerations in the geographic distribution of
economic activities. One of the motivations was to replicate the
alleged success of Italian industrial districts in the 1980's: the idea was
to enhance, through public intervention, collaborations which
developed “naturally” in Italy.
Around one hundred projects were submitted and around ﬁfty of
them received a subsidy in 1999. An additional ﬁfty were funded in
2000, when the agency in charge issued a new tender. The tender was
then transformed into a permanent one, and each year new or old
propositions (only a handful of them now)were getting approved and
funded by an ad hoc national commission. The policy was more or less
abandoned in the second half of the 2000's.
The stated aim of the policy was to give a small monetary incentive
(the average subsidy is around 37,500 euros) to set off or reinforce
clusters. Conditions to receive this subsidy were not very restrictive at
the beginning of the process. Conditions were then more demanding
(established collaborations, credibility of the proposed action,
knowledge of direct competitors, etc.). Ofﬁcially, the policy funds a
project held by a collective organization. This is important since the
subsidy is consequently not directly given to ﬁrms but to the collective
structure. Very often, the ofﬁcial candidate organizing the project is a
local public authority and private ﬁrms join once the structure has
secured the necessary funding. A wide range of actions can be funded:
A study of feasibility for the development of a common brand, the
creation of a grouping of employers or the implementation of
collective actions in the ﬁeld of exports for instance. The geographical
scale of a LPS is generally the département or the employment area.4
The LPS can be seen as the ﬁrst cluster policy in France. A new
policy, called “competitiveness clusters” that started in 2005 is a much
more ambitious and costly cluster policy than the one analyzed here
(note however that a quarter of LPS projects have been transformed
into competitiveness clusters). Even though the LPS policy is modest
in terms of ﬁnancial support, we believe that studying it is still
relevant for the analysis of cluster policies. Indeed, all cluster policies
are not absorbing large amounts of public spending. In Austria, the
“CIR-CE (Co-operation in Innovation and Research with Central and
Eastern Europe)” policy, ﬁnanced by national budgets and European
structural funds between 2005 and 2008, provided fundings that
could not exceed 150,000 euros per network. The “Micro-clusters
reinforcement programme”, implemented in Catalonia, provides each
micro-cluster initiative with a starting subsidy of 20,000 euros that
can then increase to 100,000–120,000 euros. In the same vein, the
Spanish Basque country, often presented as a pioneer in terms of
cluster policy, promotes an approach based on a light funding by
public authorities. However, the importance of these “small” cluster
policies should not be underestimated: they often exert a leverage
effect as ﬁrms in publicly sustained clusters can get more money from
other ﬁnancing schemes. As many other public policies, the LPS policy
is speciﬁc in several dimensions so that our results cannot be
generalized to other cluster policies. Nevertheless, we believe that
the study of the LPS policy can highlight some drawbacks linked to the
implementation of cluster policies that are common to many
countries.
2.2. The data and methodology
We use French annual business surveys5 data, provided by the
Frenchministry of Industry. We have information at both the ﬁrm and
plant levels. This is restricted to ﬁrms with more than 20 employees
and all the plants of those ﬁrms. Our data cover the period 1996–2004.
At the ﬁrm level, we have all the balance-sheet data (in particular,
production, value-added, employment, capital, exports, and aggregate
wages) and information about ﬁrm location, ﬁrm industry classiﬁca-
tion and ﬁrm structure (e.g. number of plants).
At the plant level, data are less exhaustive; they contain plant
location, plant industry classiﬁcation, plant number of employees and
information about the ﬁrm the plant belongs to.
We obtained from the public authority in charge of the LPS policy,
the Datar, the list of LPS and the information about the subsidies
obtained as well as the structure which administers. We contacted
individually during the year 2006 around 90 LPS, to ask them the list
of their adherents.Workable ﬁles were obtained for 57 of them,which
represent 3233 ﬁrms. We however lost information when we merged
these ﬁrms with the annual business surveys to obtain data on
production and employment. Many of the LPS reported the name and
the address of ﬁrms, but not their national identiﬁcation number. We
consequently had to ﬁnd out most ﬁrms in the annual business
surveys thanks to their name and their zip code only. We merged
successfully only 641 ﬁrms (the others are probably ﬁrms with less
than 20 employees or with badly collected information), from 45 LPS
created between 1999 and 2003.
From a geographic point of view, we dropped all ﬁrms located in
Corsica and in overseas départements. Consequently, our sample covers
the 94 continental French départements and 341 employment areas.
From a sectoral point of view, we only retained ﬁrms belonging to
manufacturing sectors.6 In particular, food-proceeding ﬁrms had to be
dropped, since the information related to those ﬁrms comes from a
different survey, not entirely compatible with the rest of manufacturing.
The observations for which value-added, employment or capital is
missing, negative or null are dropped.7 We deﬂated value-added data
by a branch price-index and capital data by an investment price-index
valid for all industrial sectors. In the end, the sample is an unbalanced
panel involving 483 ﬁrms which belong to a LPS. Eighty-eight 3-digit
industrial sectors and thirty-nine LPS are represented.
Several remarks are in order with respect to the important
difference between the number of LPS ﬁrms we identiﬁed and the
number of treated ﬁrms we have in our sample. First, from a total of
around 100 LPS labeled by public authorities during the period under
study, we successfully contacted 90 LPS. 57 LPS out of the 90 that
responded provided us with exploitable data. It is likely that the LPS
that replied and gave us exploitable information are the most
involved in the monitoring of their network. Consequently, if we
have a selection bias in our sample, we have good reasons to think
that it is an upward bias with respect to the impact of the policy.
Observations are lost because many ﬁrms in the LPS are smaller than
20 employees. This can be a problem if the impact of the policy is
4 The départements are administrative areas. Employment areas are economic
entities deﬁned on the basis of workers' commuting. There are 94 départements and
341 employment areas in continental France.
5 Called in French “Enquêtes Annuelles d'Entreprises”.
6 In the French 2-digit classiﬁcation, manufacturing sectors correspond to sector 17
(textile) to sector 36 (miscellaneous), sector 23 (reﬁning) excluded.
7 We also dropped outliers, dropping 1% extremes for the following variables:
capital intensity, yearly capital intensity growth rate, yearly capital growth rate, yearly
employment growth rate.
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heterogeneous according to the size of ﬁrms. We test on our sample
the existence of such an heterogeneity and results show that this is
not the case; however, if the threshold for relevant heterogeneity is
below 20 employees, we cannot capture it and our results are
therefore best interpreted as valid for ﬁrms larger than 20 employees.
Moreover, if the determinants of the selection of small ﬁrms in the LPS
do not differ from these determinants for large ﬁrms, the ﬁrst step of
our analysis, on the determinants of the LPS policy, is not impacted by
the reduction of our sample. Finally, it is possible that due to poorly
collected or misreported information, we do not identify, for a given
LPS, all the ﬁrms that are in our sample. In this case, the analysis
conducted at the industry-area level should correct for this.
For employment areas data, we use the “Atlas des zones d'emploi”
publishedby the INSEE, the French institute fornational statistics, in 1998.
2.3. Which industries are targeted by LPS?
Some simple descriptive statistics on the industries (deﬁned at the
3 digit level) targeted by the LPS policy are useful. We had to drop the
“Weapons and ammunitions” industry, which is a clear outlier in
terms of evolution during the period. We distinguish the manufac-
turing industries which are not represented in the LPS (25 non-
treated industries), the industries represented by less than 10 LPS
ﬁrms (46 industries) and the industries represented in the LPS by at
least 10 ﬁrms (16 industries). The average of several indicators for
these three categories is presented in Table 1.
In 1996, the average labour productivity is lower in industries where
LPS are the most important than in the rest of manufacturing industries.
LPS industries are also much more labour intensive than the others.
Between 1996 and 2004, the employment loss for the average
French non-LPS manufacturing industries is 10.68%. LPS industries
lost much less employment (8.82% and 3.84%). Their value-added also
increasedmore (23.26% and 26.27% vs 19.30%), but not proportionally
to employment, so that labour productivity increased on average by
34.54% in non-LPS industries, and by only 32.54% and 34.31% in LPS
industries. Finally, LPS ﬁrms belong to industries that export less than
the average but their exports grew faster over the period.
To summarize, LPS industries are on average much more labour
intensive than the rest of manufacturing; they destroyed less
employment than other industries in the 1996–2004 period but
their productivity gains were also lower.
2.4. Who are LPS ﬁrms?
Wenowanalyze the characteristics ofﬁrms that participated to one of
the selected LPS. Table 2 presents summary statistics about the LPS ﬁrms
of our sample. They are larger and less productive than non-LPS ﬁrms.
However, the standard deviation for all their characteristics (except for
thenumberof employees) is lower than for otherﬁrms. This suggests that
the policy targeted ﬁrms with speciﬁc characteristics.
To go further in this analysis, we estimate, with a probit model, the
probability for a ﬁrm i, from sector s and located in département z to
become a LPS ﬁrm. We take into account average ﬁrm-level
characteristics prior their entrance in a LPS. We also control for
characteristics of the employment areas where the ﬁrms are located.
The way we compute ﬁrm-level average characteristics is not trivial.
Our panel is unbalanced. Moreover, ﬁrms entered the LPS scheme in
different years between 1999 and 2003. Hence, the number of years
for which we can observe the ﬁrm characteristics prior their entrance
in a LPS is not the same for all ﬁrms. If ﬁrms' characteristics are
affected by annual common shocks, the computation of pre-LPS
average characteristics could therefore be noisy; hence, we correct all
individual observations for yearly trends. We then compute for each
ﬁrm its average characteristics for the years before its “entry” in a LPS.
For non-LPS ﬁrms and ﬁrms in LPS sustained in 2003, these average
characteristics are computed with all the available de-trended
observations from 1996 to 2003. All the ﬁrms that disappeared before
1999, and which could consequently not be in a LPS, are dropped. We
keep in the end 345 LPS ﬁrms in the sample.
The results are displayed in Table 3. The index of TFP we use is
obtainedwith an estimate of a production function at the 2 digit industry
level, following anOLS approach. In Appendix A,we show that our results
are qualitatively robust when we use a GMM TFP index (see Table 14).
Column (1) presents results from a simple probit, where we control for
the size (total sales) of the ﬁrm, its TFP and TFP growth rate, the amount
of subsidies (other than LPS) it receives and the number of other ﬁrms of
its own industry in the département. In this very simple speciﬁcation, LPS
ﬁrms appear bigger than the others and seem to receive more public
subsidies overall. These two characteristics of LPS ﬁrms are very robust.
One interpretation is that LPS ﬁrms are important for local politicians
because they are big employers and that they are good at lobbying for
public subsidies. LPSﬁrms also tend to be less productive than the others.
The inclusion of industry-ﬁxed effects in regression (2) and of
départements ﬁxed effects in regression (3) does not change these
results except that the coefﬁcient on TFP is now positive, but
insigniﬁcant. Given that the coefﬁcient on TFP is negative and
signiﬁcant when we do not control for industry and département
ﬁxed effects, this conﬁrms that LPS ﬁrms operate in less productive
industries (see Section 2.3) and are located in less productive
départements.8
Table 1
Industry level summary statistics.
Variables Non-LPS
industries
Industries with less
than 10 LPS ﬁrms
Industries with at least
10 LPS ﬁrms
Average level in 1996
Labour
productivity
43.64 43.54 37.64
Capitalistic
intensity
65.72 57.27 40.31
Export share 0.34 0.34 0.24
Evolution between 1996 and 2004 (in %)
Employees −10.68 −8.82 −3.84
Value-added 19.30 23.26 26.27
Labour
productivity
34.54 32.54 34.31
Exports 23.19 50.15 56.81
Note: Labour productivity=value-added/employees, capitalistic intensity=capital
stock/employees, export share=export value/sales. Values are in thousands of real
euros.
8 This is also conﬁrmed by the fact that LPS ﬁrm are located in départements which
receive the “Prime d'Aménagement du territoire” (PAT), one of the main instruments
of regional policy in France and which have a high share of subsidized employment:
see Table 15 in the Appendix.
Table 2
Summary statistics about ﬁrms.
LPS ﬁrms Non-LPS ﬁrms
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Obs Mean Std. dev.
Value-added 3286 11806.79 35426.5 171,322 6679.1 45160.81
Employees 3286 262.19 750.18 171,322 131.43 647.91
Capital Stock 3286 17362.01 69287.36 171,322 8274.4 105470.3
Labour productivity 3286 39.92 19.03 171,322 43.05 37.42
Note: Value-added, capital and labour productivity are expressed in thousands of real
euros.
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Note also that the number of ﬁrms from the same industry in the
département, which is a proxy for potential localization economies,
is negative and signiﬁcant in regressions (1) and (2). This is
surprising; the LPS policy is supposed to be a cluster-promotion
policy and we expected a positive coefﬁcient on this variable. But
the coefﬁcient is strongly positive and signiﬁcant when départe-
ments ﬁxed effects are added. Hence, an explanation would be that
the LPS policy targeted clusters which are relevant at a local level,
but not at a national level.
In regression (4), we include some characteristics of the
employment areas where ﬁrms are located. The results are robust
to this inclusion. Moreover, these regressions show that, relative to
the average in the département, LPS ﬁrms are located in areas
which are more dependent on industry, richer, and with less
workers with vocational training. Note however that their average
taxable income growth was smaller over the period of 1984–1994.
We will use this regression and what it tells us about the observable
characteristics of LPS ﬁrms to construct our sample for the
matching approach when we analyze the impact of LPS status on
ﬁrm performance.
2.5. Empirical methodology
The stated objective of the LPS policy is to improve ﬁrms'
competitiveness. To analyze whether it was successful in this respect
we quantify the impact of the LPS policy on ﬁrms' total factor
productivity (TFP). We also analyze its impact on ﬁrms' employment
and on ﬁrms' exports. We use several techniques developed in the
evaluation literature. The ﬁrst one is the standard “difference-in-
difference” method (DD) (see Bertrand et al., 2004).
yit is our dependent variable (ﬁrms' TFP, employment or exports).
The relation we bring to data is the following:
yit = γlpsi + θlpsinit + dt + it ð1Þ
where lpsi is a dummy variable that identiﬁes ﬁrms which at some
point beneﬁt from the LPS label. This dummy captures all time-
invariant unobservable characteristics speciﬁc to ﬁrms targeted by
the LPS policy. lps_init is a dummy which equals 1 for LPS ﬁrms the
years after the public decision to subsidize their LPS. dt is a time
trend, common to all ﬁrms. If εit is orthogonal to the regressors, θ is
the DD estimator of the effect of LPS policy on ﬁrm's performance. It
is indeed obtained by comparing the evolution of performance for
LPS ﬁrms before and after their entry in the LPS, to the evolution of
performance for non-LPS ﬁrms during the same period. However,
Section 2.4 showed that LPS ﬁrms had particular characteristics,
especially in terms of location and industries, which both
determined their probability of belonging to a LPS and their
performance before. This suggests several sources of bias in our
estimates of γ and θ. This is the reason why we progressively add
several ﬁxed effects to end up with an individual ﬁxed effect
estimation. Since some ﬁrms change area or industry over the
period, this leads to a ﬁrm–industry–département ﬁxed effect (in
that case, the variable lpsi is captured by the ﬁxed effect and it is
thus dropped from the estimation). This is the “true” DD estimator
of θ, since it compares the evolution of y before and after the
treatment for a given LPS ﬁrm to the evolution of y for a given non-
LPS ﬁrm. This estimation corrects for individual characteristics of
ﬁrms (given their industry and location) invariant across time.
However, if the fact of being in a LPS is also correlated to speciﬁc
shocks or to temporal trends (if  it=ui+ηit and if E(ηit+1−ηit) is
different for LPS and non-LPS ﬁrms), our estimation will suffer from
a simultaneity bias. The best way to control for both unobserved
invariant characteristics and unobserved idiosyncratic shocks
would be to instrument the LPS variables. There is however no
obvious set of natural instruments that would be good predictors of
entry into the LPS scheme, while being unrelated to the ﬁrm's
performance. We address this issue by resorting to several
alternative techniques. We ﬁrst add an industry-year ﬁxed effect
to control for shocks at the industry level. However, this method
will not entirely solve the problem if there are unobserved
dynamics at the ﬁrm level, and not at the industry level, correlated
to the policy. This is why we also use estimators which control for
unobserved dynamics at the ﬁrm level: we use the individual ﬁxed
effect estimator developed by Baltagi and Wu (1999) which models
the unobserved disturbance as an AR(1). We also implement a
triple differences approach, using the ﬁrst-difference of y as a
dependent variable: it amounts to estimating the impact of the
policy on the growth rate of variables; it will control for individual
trends which are invariant across time. In the end, we combine
these methods with a matching approach. This accounts for the fact
that LPS ﬁrms are speciﬁc in the observable characteristics and
identiﬁes a group of non-treated ﬁrms with the most similar set of
observables; if the evolution of performance can be predicted by
ﬁrm-level observables, matching controls for the potential remain-
ing unobserved dynamics.
3. Results
3.1. LPS and productivity
We ﬁrst present our results on TFP. To estimate ﬁrm TFP, we
regress ﬁrm value-added on employment and capital and keep the
residuals. We estimate production functions at the 2 digit industry
level; the estimated elasticities for employment and capital are
Table 3
LPS determinants.
Dependent variable: LPS status of ﬁrm i
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean (ln Salesit) 0.041c 0.055b 0.102a 0.105a
(0.023) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
Mean (TFPit) −0.147c −0.044 0.018 0.013
(0.081) (0.070) (0.088) (0.072)
Mean (TFPgrowthit) −0.038 −0.045 −0.036 −0.036
(0.096) (0.116) (0.121) (0.125)
Mean (ln Subsidiesit) 0.038a 0.040a 0.034a 0.034a
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Mean (ln (#of ﬁrms,
same ind.−dép. it)
−0.096b −0.143a 0.173a 0.155b
(0.037) (0.052) (0.057) (0.062)
ln Mean (Taxable
net incomez1994)
2.109a
(0.496)
ln Mean (Taxable net
income growthratez1984−1994)
−0.992a
(0.321)
ln Populationdensityz1994 −0.102
(0.065)
ln Industrial jobssharez1994 0.724a
(0.156)
ln Share of population with
vocational trainingz1990
−1.237a
(0.476)
Industry ﬁxed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Département ﬁxed effects No No Yes Yes
N 16,527 16,527 16,527 16,527
R2 0.027 0.07 0.193 0.206
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses a, b and c respectively denoting signiﬁcance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. All regressions are clustered at the employment area level.
Necessarily, t≤ lps_year.
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respectively on average 0.80 and 0.15. In Appendix A, we discuss the
limitations of the OLS approach to TFP estimation and perform
robustness checks where we estimate TFP thanks to the GMM and to
the method developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Results are
very similar.
3.1.1. A graphical exploration
We start with a graphical analysis of the evolution of productivity
differential between LPS and non-LPS ﬁrms. We estimate the
following four regressions:
tfpit = ∑
5
j=−2
αjlps¯
in
ijt
+ dt + it ð2Þ
tfpit = fez + ∑
5
j=−2
αjlps¯
in
ijt
+ dt + it ð3Þ
tfpit = fez + fes + ∑
5
j=−2
αjlps¯
in
ijt
+ dt + it ð4Þ
tfpit = fei + ∑
5
j=−2
αjlps¯
in
ijt
+ dt + it ð5Þ
where lps_inijt equals 1 if j years separate time t from the moment
when ﬁrm i will become (resp. has become) a LPS ﬁrm. The ﬁrst
regression simply estimates the difference of productivity between
LPS and non-LPS ﬁrms according to the number of years which
separate the LPS ﬁrm from the reception of the subsidy. We then add
ﬁxed effects with increasing levels of detail: département z, then
département z/sector s, and ﬁnally ﬁrm–département–sector level i.9
Only the last regression actually yields a difference-in-difference
estimator of the LPS effect. The four sets of results are presented in
panels (a) to (d) of Fig. 1.
We ﬁrst perform the estimation on the whole sample. The grey
zone on each panel corresponds to the 5% conﬁdence interval.
According to the ﬁrst estimation, in the absence of any control in panel
(a), LPS ﬁrms are not very signiﬁcantly different from the others two
years before their entry in a LPS, but a negative and signiﬁcant
productivity gap grows over time between both types of ﬁrms. With
départements and industry controls in panel (c), the negative gap is
reversed and results exhibit a positive productivity differential
between LPS and non-LPS ﬁrms before entry. Nevertheless, LPS
ﬁrms still seem to be on a declining path in terms of productivity, even
though the differential with non-LPS ﬁrms for a given year is never
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The graphical analysis clearly suggests that
LPS ﬁrms are on a different trend from the others. When ﬁrm–
département–industry ﬁxed effects are controlled for in panel (d),
results should be interpreted in terms of productivity growth
differential. The decline seems to be stopped after the entry in the
LPS, but then reemerges afterwards.
Fig. 2 presents the same results for single plant ﬁrms. Indeed, the
LPS policy is supposed to help ﬁrms better coordinate their
strategies with ﬁrms nearby and more generally to enable ﬁrms to
beneﬁt more from the network of ﬁrms in the region. Multi-plant
ﬁrms, which are also typically bigger, may be less dependent on
their local environment and therefore respond less to the LPS policy.
Moreover, and maybe more importantly, we do not have the
information on the LPS status at the plant level. Hence, for multi-
plant ﬁrms, the effect of the policy may be both weaker and mis-
measured. Hence, we analyze the case of single plant ﬁrms (353 LPS
ﬁrms) which do not suffer from those problems. Comments are
roughly the same.
We now turn to proper difference-in-difference econometric
analysis to investigate the robustness of those ﬁrst results more
systematically. In Table 4, on the whole sample, the simple OLS
regression conﬁrms that the LPS ﬁrms are “structurally” less
productive than the others (with a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient
on the LPS dummy). Moreover, they experience a negative and very
signiﬁcant relative productivity drop once they are in a LPS.
Interestingly, once industry and départements ﬁxed effects are
taken into account (regression (4)), the coefﬁcient on “LPS ﬁrms”
becomes positive and signiﬁcant; again this means that LPS ﬁrms
belong to less productive industries and départements. Nevertheless,
“Being in a LPS” still has a negative coefﬁcient which persists when
we introduce Firm-département–industry ﬁxed effects in regression
(5), though closer to zero and less signiﬁcant. There are several
possible interpretations of this rather pessimistic result on the LPS
policy. One is that the LPS policy causes this negative effect. It is
possible that the ﬁrms that receive the LPS label become more
receptive to public pressure to postpone workers layouts. In this
interpretation, ﬁrmsmay choose to forego labour saving productivity
improvements.
Another interpretation – not exclusive of the ﬁrst one – is that
ﬁrms that enter a LPS do it when they face difﬁculties: ηit and lps_init
are certainly correlated and there would consequently be a
simultaneity bias in the estimation of the causal impact of the policy
on ﬁrms' TFP. The graphical analysis tends to corroborate this idea
since we showed that the productivity of LPS ﬁrms exhibit a relative
declining pattern with respect to non-LPS ﬁrms, from two years
before to ﬁve years after the entry in the LPS.We address this issue in
Section 3.1.2.
Results on single plant ﬁrms are presented in the bottom part of
Table 4. They conﬁrm our main conclusions but some subtle
differences emerge: LPS single plant ﬁrms operate in less produc-
tive industries and are located in less productive départements, but
once we control for this, the coefﬁcient on “Being in a LPS” is not
signiﬁcant any more: their productivity growth following the
implementation of the policy is not different from the one of non-
LPS ﬁrms.
In both samples, we control in regression (6) for the amount of
subsidies a ﬁrm receives on a given year. We have already stated
that the LPS subsidy was a one shot subsidy granted to the structure
that manages the LPS and not to ﬁrms directly. However, since we
have seen that LPS ﬁrms are ﬁrms which perceive more subsidies
than the others, we may capture something else than the effect of
the LPS policy with our estimation. The inclusion of the total
amount of subsidies a ﬁrm receives each year does not affect our
results.
3.1.2. LPS and temporal endogeneity
The graphical analysis showed that LPS ﬁrms were on a declining
path – relative to other ﬁrms – before their entry in a LPS. We do not
control for this in the difference-in-difference approach which can
bias our results. We do not have any natural instrument to purge our
estimations from trends which would be speciﬁc to LPS ﬁrms. We
consequently resort to alternative strategies:
• We introduce in the DD estimation industry-year ﬁxed effects in
order to purge the estimation from shocks common to all ﬁrms from
the same industry in a given year (technically, we run the DD
regressions on the variables de-trended for industry-year ﬁxed
effects).
• The industry-year ﬁxed effect approach corrects for industry level
dynamics. However, it does not control for ﬁrm-level dynamics. To
do so, we use the ﬁxed-effect estimator developed by Baltagi and
9 Remember that some ﬁrms change département or industry during the period; in
order to control for geographic and sectoral unobservables, the right individual ﬁxed
effect is consequently a ﬁrm-département-industry ﬁxed effect.
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Wu (1999); it allows us to take into account an auto-regressive
process of the ﬁrst order of the disturbance term at the individual
level.10
• We also run our regressions using annual TFP growth rate as a
dependent variable. Put differently, we estimate the effect of the LPS
policy using a triple differences approach, which allows us to control
for ﬁrm-speciﬁc temporal trends that do not change over time.
• Finally, we can improve the estimation of the LPS policy impact by
combining the preceding estimation procedures with a matching
strategy. We saw in Section 2.4 that there was a clear selection of
LPS ﬁrms on observable characteristics. If those characteristics are
also correlated with the evolution of ﬁrms' TFP, this can correct for
the remaining endogeneity. It also corrects the estimation for
potential heterogeneity in the sensitivity to the policy by
removing from the sample ﬁrms which had no chance or very
little chance to be treated. Using the last regression of Table 3 in
Section 2.4, we compute the probability for all ﬁrms to belong to a
LPS. Note that in this regression, all the ﬁrms in industries or
départements which are not represented in the LPS have already
been eliminated. We then reduce the sample to ﬁrms that share
similar observable characteristics. To do so, we eliminate LPS ﬁrms
that have very different characteristics from non-LPS ﬁrms and
vice versa, based on the probability to enter in a LPS we have
computed for each ﬁrm. The average probability for LPS ﬁrms to
enter in a LPS is around 10%; the same probability is close to 2% for
non-LPS ﬁrms. We drop from the sample those ﬁrms that have a
probability to be treated above the 99th percentile of non-LPS
ﬁrms (this gives us an upper bound probability in our sample
equal to 17.6%) and below the 5th percentile of LPS ones (this gives
us a probability threshold equal to 0.7%). This helps us comply
more conﬁdently with the common support condition of the
matching approach, according to which the probability to be
treated must have the same support for treated and non-treated
ﬁrms in the sample. 260 LPS ﬁrms remain in the sample, out of
which 169 are single plant ﬁrms. Tables 21 and 22 show that that
matching contributes greatly in making treated and non-treated
ﬁrms ex-ante more similar.
Results are displayed in Table 5. Resorting to triple differences
mechanically reduces the sample since there are no observations of
TFP growth for the year 1996. For comparability purposes, the ﬁrst
regression replicates the DD estimator on the sample available for
triple differences. We can see that our estimations are not very
different from those performed before: when all ﬁrms are consid-
ered, the DD estimator is negative and roughly equal to −0.02, but
not signiﬁcant anymore. It is very close to zero and not signiﬁcant
when single plant ﬁrms only are retained in the sample. When10 We use the xtregar procedure implemented in Stata.
Fig. 1. LPS ﬁrms and evolution of OLS TFP.
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industry-year ﬁxed effects are controlled for, the coefﬁcient remains
negative but increases slightly; it is not signiﬁcant whatever the
sample is. When we control for dynamics at the ﬁrm level thanks to
an AR(1), the coefﬁcient becomes positive but insigniﬁcant and very
close to zero.With triple differences, the coefﬁcient is positive in both
samples (respectively equal to 0.016 and 0.018); it is moreover
signiﬁcant at the 10% level on the sample containing all ﬁrms. The
same regressions are performed on the matched sample and results
are presented in Table 6: the results are roughly the same, except that
the triple differences estimate is signiﬁcant at the 10% level in both
samples (respectively equal to 0.022 and 0.028). This positive and
slightly signiﬁcant result corresponds to the stabilization of the
declining path in the years after the entry in the LPS that we observe
in Figs. 1 and 2. However, these graphs show that after ﬁve years for
the whole sample and two years for single plant ﬁrms, the decline
accelerates again.
To conclude, the graphical analysis showed that LPS ﬁrms were on
a particular trend before beneﬁting from the policy; the DD estimator
does not control for this and this tends to bias downwards the
estimation of the impact of the policy. When we control for the
speciﬁc dynamics of LPS ﬁrms productivity, the results depend on the
estimator: no signiﬁcant effect is detected through an AR(1)
estimation strategy and a weakly signiﬁcant positive impact is
measured through a triple differences approach. Hence, if the LPS
policy had any positive impact on ﬁrm-level productivity, the
graphical and the econometric analysis suggest that it is at most a
weak, short-run effect.
3.1.3. Further issues
A possible defense of the LPS policy is that the absence of a
measurable effect comes from the small size of the monetary subsidy
involved. In other words, the policy is good but should receive more
funds. To test this idea, we use for all single plant ﬁrms11 involved in a
LPS the information on the amount of the subsidy perceived by the
LPS they belong to. Note that the subsidy is a small (one shot) subsidy
(the average subsidy in our sample is around 40,000 euros) and is not
granted directly to the ﬁrms but to the structure in charge of the LPS.
In Table 7, the signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on the amount of the
subsidy in the ﬁrst regression suggests that the strongest monetary
support goes to the LPS where ﬁrms are relatively more in decline.
This negative coefﬁcient cannot be interpreted in causal terms since
the subsidy variable has no impact once individual ﬁxed-effect is
introduced.12 It however conﬁrms that equity considerations are at
work in the implementation of the policy.
11 Since we do not know which plant obtained the subsidy, we concentrate on single-
plant ﬁrms. These are also the ﬁrms for which a positive effect, if it exists, should be
best measured. We have the necessary information for 294 ﬁrms.
12 Results are the same when using an AR(1) or a triple-differences estimator.
Fig. 2. LPS single plant ﬁrms and evolution of OLS TFP.
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We also investigated the existence of heterogeneity in the impact of
the policy according to the size of ﬁrms and the size or the governance
structure of the LPS: no signiﬁcant heterogeneity could be detected.
We then testedwhether the LPSpolicy had aneffect on the sizeof the
clusters they targeted. Table 8 shows that LPS ﬁrms belong to “local”
pre-existing clusters: the number of ﬁrms from the same industry in the
département (the left hand side variable in the regressions of this table)
is much higher for LPS ﬁrms once département ﬁxed effects are
introduced. If département ﬁxed effects are not taken into account, LPS
seem to be, on the contrary, smaller than other clusters at the national
level. However, there is no indication that the cluster policy was
attractive to other ﬁrms of the same sector. If anything, the years the LPS
are implemented are years duringwhich the size of the cluster towhich
these ﬁrms belong relatively decreases. Since Martin et al. (forthcom-
ing) have shown that the size of clusters has a positive impact on French
ﬁrms’ productivity, this result may partly explain why we do not ﬁnd
productivity gains for LPS ﬁrms.
3.2. LPS and ﬁrms' labour demand
Up to now, the LPS policy, in spite of the ofﬁcial discourse
presenting it as a clear break with policies in favor of regions and
industries in difﬁculty, appears clearly as a defensive policy. If political
economy factors are at the origin of the gap between the stated
objectives and what we measure, we may be missing all the action
when looking at the effect of the policy on productivity. The most
important objective for national and local policy makers involved in
the policy may in fact be employment of these ﬁrms. Preserving jobs
rather than increasing productivity may have been the real objective.
This is what Criscuolo et al. (2007) concluded from the study of
Regional Selective Assistance in the UK.
To look at this, we adopt the same strategy as for productivity and
start with graphical analysis. It appears in Figs. 3 and 4 that LPS ﬁrms
are “structurally” bigger than the others. Once individual ﬁxed effects
have been taken into account (DD estimator), LPS ﬁrms still appear to
grow slightly faster than the others. But they do before and after their
entry in a LPS, without any clear change in the pattern of differential
growth rate, so that it is difﬁcult to identify a speciﬁc role of the policy.
We then concentrate on the econometric analysis. We regress the
ﬁrms' current employment on the two variables “LPS ﬁrm” and “Being
in a LPS” (Table 9). We develop in Appendix A a more structural
approach of ﬁrms' labour demand, which yields similar results.
Whatever the sample and the estimation strategy we use, the
impact of the policy never appears signiﬁcant, and the coefﬁcient is
very close to zero when ﬁrm-level dynamics is taken into account.
This result is consistent with graph (d), which suggested that the
relative growth rate of employment in LPS ﬁrms was already
Table 4
LPS and OLS TFP.
Dependent variable ln TFP
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All ﬁrms
LPS ﬁrm −0.044a −0.001 0.000 0.030b
(0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014)
Being in a LPS −0.066a −0.062a −0.059a −0.057a −0.023c −0.023c
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Total amount of other subsidies −0.000c
(0.000)
N 174,608 174,608 174,608 174,608 174,608 174,608
R2 0.02 0.28 0.10 0.31 0.02 0.02
Single plant ﬁrms
LPS ﬁrm −0.053a −0.024 0.014 0.019
(0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016)
Being in a LPS −0.054a −0.049a −0.043b −0.042b −0.009 −0.009
(0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014)
Total amount of other subsidies −0.000
(0.000)
N 117,286 117,286 117,286 117,286 117,286 117,286
R2 0.02 0.28 0.14 0.32 0.02 0.02
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed effects No Yes No Yes No No
Département ﬁxed effects No No Yes Yes No No
Firm-département–industry ﬁxed effects No No No No Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
Table 5
LPS and OLS TFP-simultaneity bias.
Dependent variable ln TFP Δln TFP
Model DD FE AR(1) DD
All ﬁrms
Being in a LPS −0.021 −0.017 0.002 0.016c
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010)
N 137,781 137,781 109,110 137,781
R2 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.00
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.37 n.a.
Single plant ﬁrms
Being in a LPS −0.009 −0.003 0.003 0.018
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012)
N 92,591 92,591 72,166 92,591
R2 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.00
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.36 n.a.
Year ﬁxed effects Yes n.a. Yes Yes
Industry-time ﬁxed effect No Yes No No
Firm-industry–département ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
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increasing before the entry in the LPS. Results are the same on the
matched sample (tables available upon request).
In conclusion, our results suggest that the LPS policy had no effect
on ﬁrms' employment.
3.3. LPS and ﬁrms' exports
Finally, we evaluate in Table 10 the impact of the LPS policy on a
third dimension of individual performance, ﬁrm-level exports.
Following an approach inspired by gravity equations, we explain
ﬁrm-level total exports by the size (in terms of employees) and the
TFP of the ﬁrm, and by the dummy identifying treated ﬁrms. As
expected, size and productivity have a very strong and positive impact
on ﬁrm-level exports. However, the LPS policy has no signiﬁcant
effect, whatever the estimator we use. The same kind of results is
obtained on the matched sample (results available upon request).
4. Robustness checks
We have conducted so far our analysis at the ﬁrm level. Two issues
arise about this methodological choice:
1. Proponentsof clusterpoliciesoftenclaimthat thesepoliciesdonotonly
affect the ﬁrms directly targeted but the whole sector in the region. In
the presence of this type of externality, the estimation of the LPS policy
at the ﬁrm level may underestimate its true economic impact.
2. There is possible measurement error in our sample of LPS ﬁrms: in
our survey, it is possible that some LPS ﬁrms are identiﬁed as control
ﬁrms. The reason is that we have to rely on partially incomplete
information provided by managers in response to our survey.
To address both issues, we now present our analysis at the
industry–département level rather than at the ﬁrm level. This allows
capturing possible local spillover effects. This also reduces the
measurement error since the geographical scale of the LPS policy is
the département. Note that we also conducted in unreported
investigations the analysis at the industry-employment area level
and that results are qualitatively the same.
4.1. LPS and industry–départements' productivity, employment and exports
We deﬁne the log of performance variable (TFP or export) y in
industry s and département z at time t as a weighted sum of ﬁrms' y:
yszt =∑
empiszt
empszt
 
× yiszt
 
ð6Þ
where empiszt is the number of employees of ﬁrm i from industry s, in
département z at time t and empszt is the number of employees from
industry s, in département z at time t.
We deﬁne an industry–département cell as being affected by the LPS
policy when at least one ﬁrm from industry s and département z has
been involved in LPS over the period. For the employment analysis, we
consider total employment in each industry–département.
Conclusions remain very similar to those obtained at the ﬁrm
level: Table 11 shows that no impact is detected either on industry–
département TFP or on industry–département employment. We ﬁnd
an impact on industry–département exports when speciﬁc dynamics
is controlled for at the industry–département level (AR(1) and triple
differences estimators). This is in line with the descriptive statistics
presented in Section 2.3, which show that exports in LPS industries
grow faster than in the other sectors over the period of 1996–2004.
We then adopt at the industry–département level the matching
strategy used for ﬁrm-level analysis; Table 12 shows that when we
compare LPS industry–département to industry–département with a
similar probability to be treated, nothing is changed for productivity
and employment. Regarding exports, the impact is now signiﬁcant at
the 5% level for the difference-in-difference estimator but results are
sensitive to the choice of the estimator and to the level of analysis (in
unreported regressions, we ﬁnd that no signiﬁcant effect can be
Table 6
LPS and OLS TFP-matching.
Dependent variable ln TFP Δln TFP
Model DD FE AR(1) DD
All ﬁrms
Being in a LPS −0.003 −0.019 0.020 0.022c
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012)
N 46,465 46,465 37,846 46,465
R2 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.00
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.39 n.a.
Single plant ﬁrms
Being in a LPS 0.020 0.007 0.029 0.028c
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015)
N 29,955 29,955 24,055 29,955
R2 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.00
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.38 n.a.
Year ﬁxed effects Yes n.a. Yes Yes
Industry-time ﬁxed effect No Yes No No
Firm-industry–département ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation.
Table 7
LPS, OLS TFP and subsidy.
Dependent variable ln TFP
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LPS ﬁrm −0.047b −0.028c 0.020 0.019
(0.022) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017)
Being in a LPS 1.088a 0.629a 1.000a 0.579b −0.188 −0.189
(0.280) (0.243) (0.272) (0.242) (0.191) (0.190)
Being in a LPS×ln(Subsidy+1) −0.312a −0.184a −0.283a −0.168b 0.048 0.048
(0.076) (0.066) (0.074) (0.066) (0.051) (0.051)
Total amount of other subsidies −0.000
(0.000)
N 116,928 116,928 116,928 116,928 116,928 116,928
R2 0.02 0.28 0.14 0.32 0.02 0.02
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed effects No Yes No Yes No No
Département ﬁxed effects No No Yes Yes No No
Firm-département–industry ﬁxed effects No No No No Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual
autocorrelation. Subsidy is in thousands real euros. Average subsidy≈39.49, median subsidy≈38.69.
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detected at the industry-employment area level, on both matched or
unmatched samples).
To sum up, the analysis at a more aggregated level is consistent
with the analysis at the ﬁrm level. We ﬁnd an impact for exports only,
but its magnitude and signiﬁcance strongly depend on the estimator
and the sample we use. This suggests that spillovers effects and
measurement errors are not very important.
4.2. LPS and ﬁrms' survival
In this section, we test the hypothesis that the LPS policy may have
affected the probability of exit of ﬁrms. Indeed, in our political
economy interpretation, this policy may have had no effect on
productivity but may have helped ﬁrms to survive and therefore to
maintain employment. We cannot test this hypothesis at the ﬁrm
Table 8
LPS and localization economies.
Dependent variable ln(#of ﬁrms same industry−area)iszt Δ ln(#of ﬁrms same industry−area)iszt
Model OLS OLS DD FE AR(1) DD
LPS ﬁrm −0.109c 0.202a
(0.060) (0.049)
Being in a LPS −0.092b −0.047 −0.017 −0.020b −0.019b 0.002
(0.040) (0.034) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes n.a. Yes Yes
Département ﬁxed effects No Yes n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Industry-time ﬁxed effects No No No Yes No No
Firm-industry–département ﬁxed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 134,474 134,474 134,474 134,474 106,243 134,474
R2 0.00 0.35 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.00
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.54 n.a. n.a.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level in regression (1), at the
industry-time level in regressions (2) and (3).
Fig. 3. LPS ﬁrms and evolution of employment.
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level because most of LPS managers gave us only the list of LPS ﬁrms
still in activity in 2006. Hence, we cannot identify LPS ﬁrms which
disappeared before our survey.
This is why we conduct the analysis at a more aggregate level. For
each industry–département, we compute the share of ﬁrms present in
the sample in 1996 and still alive in 2004, so that we have one
observation per industry–département.
The ﬁrst regression in Table 13 shows that industry–départements
targeted by the LPS policy are characterized by a higher survival rate
between 1996 and 2004. We then control for the level of productivity
and the average size of ﬁrms in the industry–département, which both
affect positively the share of surviving ﬁrms between 1996 and 2004. It
is well known that larger and more productive ﬁrms are less likely to
exit (see for example Alvarez andGörg, 2009).When average individual
characteristics are controlled for, no LPS premium is detected. This is in
line with our ﬁnding that LPS ﬁrms are larger than average. Controlling
for industry and département ﬁxed effects then does not affect the
conclusion: the coefﬁcient on LPS policy is positive but not signiﬁcant.
5. Conclusion
Our results on the ﬁrst cluster policy implemented in France are not
very positive. First, the policy targeted ﬁrms in regions and sectors that
were experiencing difﬁcult times in terms of productivity and therefore
competitiveness. This was not its ofﬁcial objective andwe can interpret
the gap between the stated and revealed objectives in political economy
terms. The administration in charge of the policy, the DATAR, was
created to promote territorial equity and to help lagging regions. It
Fig. 4. LPS single plant ﬁrms and evolution of employment.
Table 9
LPS and ﬁrms' labour demand-simultaneity bias.
Dependent variable ln Employeesit Δln Employeesit
Model DD FE AR(1) DD
All ﬁrms
Being in a LPS 0.021 0.021 0.007 0.002
(0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005)
N 137,781 137,781 109,110 137,781
R2 0.03 0.00 0.39 0.03
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.69 n.a.
Single plant ﬁrms
Being in a LPS 0.017 0.016 0.006 −0.003
(0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.006)
N 92,591 92,591 72,166 92,591
R2 0.03 0.00 0.47 0.03
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.64 n.a.
Year ﬁxed effects Yes n.a. Yes Yes
Industry-time ﬁxed effect No Yes No No
Firm-industry–département
ﬁxed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standarderrors inparentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the1%, 5%
and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual autocorrelation.
119P. Martin et al. / Regional Science and Urban Economics 41 (2011) 108–123
Author's personal copy
appears that it was not able or willing to change in practice and our
results point to bureaucratic continuity. Another possible interpretation
of the gap between stated and revealed objectives is that the policy was
captured by ﬁrms. Second, the policy did not succeed in reversing the
relative decline in productivity for the targeted ﬁrms.
Third, the policy had no effect on the employment and exports of
ﬁrms involved in the LPS policy.
Our results would be consistent with a political economy
interpretation: the revealed objective of the policy was to protect
some large ﬁrms (LPS ﬁrms are larger than average) in declining
regions and sectors. One could argue that this policy may have had no
effect on ﬁrm-level performance but at least was not very costly. Note
that one reason could be that the subsidies were too small to have a
real impact and/or to attract the most dynamic ﬁrms. However, we
have shown that the largest subsidies had been given to ﬁrms in
decline. This low price tag does not apply to a more recent and
ambitious cluster policy implemented in France, called competitive-
ness clusters, with a 1.5 billion euros price tag.
Table 10
LPS and ﬁrms' exports-simultaneity bias.
Dependent variable ln Exportsit Δln Exportsit
Model DD FE AR(1) DD
All ﬁrms
ln (employees) 1.483a 1.623a 1.364a 1.104a
(0.083) (0.080) (0.074) (0.119)
ln TFP 0.532a 0.585a 0.472a 0.516a
(0.052) (0.052) (0.044) (0.057)
Being in a LPS 0.121 0.112 0.053 0.117
(0.171) (0.173) (0.171) (0.121)
N 137,781 137,781 109,110 137,781
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.35 n.a.
Single plant ﬁrms
ln (employees) 1.444a 1.606a 1.345a 0.980a
(0.114) (0.110) (0.102) (0.151)
ln TFP 0.546a 0.586a 0.471a 0.506a
(0.068) (0.068) (0.059) (0.074)
Being in a LPS 0.133 0.126 0.212 0.048
(0.225) (0.226) (0.224) (0.146)
N 92,591 92,591 72,166 92,591
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.35 n.a.
Year ﬁxed effects Yes n.a. Yes Yes
Industry-time ﬁxed effect No Yes No No
Firm-industry–département
ﬁxed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standarderrors inparentheses. a, b and c respectivelydenoting signiﬁcance at the1%,5%
and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual autocorrelation.
Table 11
LPS and industry/département performance-simultaneity bias.
Dependent variable Avg ln TFPszt Δ Avg ln TFPszt
Model DD FE AR(1) DD
Being in a LPS −0.013 −0.008 −0.006 −0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.007)
N 31,712 31,712 27,085 31,712
R2 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.00
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.36 n.a.
Dependent variable ln Employeesszt Δln Employeesszt
Model DD FE AR(1) DD
Being in a LPS 0.012 −0.020 0.001 −0.011
(0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.017)
N 31,712 31,712 27,085 31,712
R2 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.49 n.a.
Dependent variable Avg ln Exportsszt Δ Avg ln Exportsszt
Model DD FE AR(1) DD
Avg ln ﬁrms' size 2.065a 2.109a 2.039a 1.979a
(0.083) (0.080) (0.046) (0.092)
Avg ln ﬁrms' TFP 0.798a 0.839a 0.755a 0.807a
(0.113) (0.113) (0.072) (0.113)
Being in a LPS 0.217 0.157 0.325b 0.172b
(0.134) (0.138) (0.138) (0.081)
N 31,712 31,712 27,085 31,712
R2 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.36 n.a.
Year ﬁxed effects Yes n.a. Yes Yes
Industry-time ﬁxed effect No Yes No No
Industry–département
ﬁxed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account autocorrelation
at the industry–département level.
Table 12
LPS and industry/département performance-matching.
Dependent variable Avg ln TFPszt Δ Avg ln TFPszt
Model DD FE AR(1) DD
Being in a LPS −0.021 −0.015 −0.019 −0.007
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.008)
N 10,682 10,682 9269 10,682
R2 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.00
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.36 n.a.
Dependent variable ln Employeesszt Δln Employeesszt
Model DD FE AR(1) DD
Being in a LPS 0.022 −0.002 0.011 −0.001
(0.034) (0.033) (0.028) (0.021)
N 10,682 10,682 9269 10,682
R2 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.52 n.a.
Dependent variable Avg ln Exportsszt Δ Avg ln Exportsszt
Model DD FE AR(1) DD
Avg ln ﬁrms' size 1.987a 1.987a 1.957a 1.930a
(0.105) (0.104) (0.062) (0.115)
Avg ln ﬁrms' TFP 0.410b 0.429b 0.518a 0.709a
(0.177) (0.178) (0.109) (0.194)
Being in a LPS 0.310b 0.236 0.292b 0.209b
(0.153) (0.151) (0.139) (0.098)
N 110,682 10,682 9269 10,682
R2 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.10
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.37 n.a.
Year ﬁxed effects Yes n.a. Yes Yes
Industry-time ﬁxed effect no Yes No No
Industry–département
ﬁxed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account autocorrelation
at the industry–département level.
Table 13
LPS and ﬁrms' survival-industry/département analysis.
Dependent variable Share of surviving ﬁrms1996−2004sz
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPS industry–département 0.036b 0.025 0.019 0.020 0.013
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
ln Average ﬁrms' TFP 0.095a 0.159a 0.112a 0.187a
(0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.024)
ln Average ﬁrms' sizesz1996 0.025a 0.011 0.036a 0.020b
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Industry ﬁxed effects no No Yes No Yes
Département ﬁxed effects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 4174 4174 4174 4174 4174
R2 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.10
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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To our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst to analyze empirically,
with ﬁrm level data, the impact of a cluster policy. It points to the
apparent failure of the LPS policy to improve the performance of
targeted ﬁrms through better cooperation and to increase the
attractiveness of existing clusters. Obviously, our results cannot be
generalized to other cluster policies which may have performed
better. However, we interpret it as a cautionary tale for policy makers
intending to commit large amounts of public money to such policies.
Appendix A
The estimation of TFP
To calculate ﬁrms' TFP, we estimate a production function. We use
a Cobb–Douglas framework and we suppose that the value-added of
ﬁrm i at time t, Yit, is:
Yit = AitK
α
it L
β
it ð7Þ
where Kit and Lit are respectively the capital and the employees of the
ﬁrm.
After a log-transformation, the model we will estimate is:
yit = αkit + βlit + it ð8Þ
The estimation of such a production function is not trivial.
Indeed, some unobserved characteristics can both affect the amount
of inputs and the level of output. If the entrepreneur is less risk-
averse than the others, he might tend to adopt a particular labour -
capital mix; he might have different innovation strategies and also
might tend to seek less risky (and potentially less lucrative)
markets. On the other hand, if the entrepreneur faces a positive
productivity shock, he might produce more and hire more people in
the same time. Here again, the estimates of inputs-elasticities may
be spurious.
An important literature has developed about the estimation of
production functions. We built on Griliches and Mairesse (1995) and
on Petrin et al. (2004) to calculate two estimates of inputs-
elasticities. For the GMM estimation, we ﬁrst-difference all the
variables andwe instrument inputs by their level at time t-2. It yields
reasonable coefﬁcients, with slightly increasing returns to scale (0.87
for labour and 0.19 for capital), but due to insufﬁcient number of
observations, we cannot run the estimation by sector. The Levin-
sohn–Petrin (LP) method is applied by sector and, on the contrary,
exhibits a decreasing return to scale production functions, with
rather credible coefﬁcients (generally around 0.70 for labour and
0.15 for capital).
We present the results for the GMM and the LP estimators of TFP.
Results are very similar to those obtained with a simple OLS TFP
index.
Table 14
LPS determinants-GMM TFP.
Dependent variable LPS status of ﬁrm i, year t
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean (ln Salesit) 0.035c 0.047b 0.103a 0.106a
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024)
Mean (GMMTFPiszt) −0.130b −0.048 0.026 0.001
(0.065) (0.067) (0.082) (0.080)
Mean (GMM TFPgrowthit) −0.034 −0.045 −0.038 −0.029
(0.098) (0.118) (0.119) (0.127)
Mean (ln Subsidiesit) 0.038a 0.040a 0.034a 0.034a
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Mean (ln (#of ﬁrms,
same ind.−dép. it)
−0.099a −0.118b 0.164a 0.156a
(0.037) (0.050) (0.053) (0.055)
ln Mean (Taxable
net incomez1994)
2.112a
(0.730)
ln Mean
(Taxable net income
growthratez1984−1994)
−0.993b
(0.468)
ln Populationdensityz1994 −0.102
(0.070)
ln Industrial jobssharez1994 0.724a
(0.186)
ln Number of people
with a CAP or aBEPz1990
−1.237b
(0.559)
Industry ﬁxed effects no Yes Yes Yes
Département ﬁxed effects no no Yes Yes
N 16,527 16,527 16,527 16,527
R2 0.025 0.064 0.189 0.207
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses a, b and c respectively denoting signiﬁcance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. All regressions are clustered at the emloyment area level.
Necessarily, t≤ lps
¯
year.
Table 16
Summary statistics about single plant ﬁrms.
LPS ﬁrms Non-LPS ﬁrms
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Obs Mean Std. dev.
Value-added 2136 3300.57 7480.25 115,150 2912.67 7670.64
Employees 2136 84.61 174.27 115,150 68.67 130.00
Capital Stock 2136 5405.29 31364.98 115,150 3286.84 16589.23
Labour productivity 2136 37.85 16.84 115,150 41.34 34.96
Note: Value-added, capital, capital intensity, labour productivity and exports are
expressed in thousands of real euros.
Table 15
LPS and regional policies.
LPS
ﬁrm
PAT in the Share of
subsidized emp.
dép.2000−2006 in the dép.2006
LPS ﬁrm 1
PAT in the dép. 2000−2006 0.04a 1
Share of subsidized
employment in the dép. 2006
0.02a 0.54a 1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses a, b and c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 17
LPS and GMM TFP-simultaneity bias.
Dependent variable ln TFP Δln TFP
Model DD FE AR(1) DD
All ﬁrms
Being in a LPS −0.023 −0.021 −0.000 0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010)
N 137,781 137,781 109,110 137,781
R2 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.00
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.37 n.a.
Single plant ﬁrms
Being in a LPS −0.010 −0.005 0.001 0.018
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012)
N 92,591 92,591 72,166 92,591
R2 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.00
AR(1) coefﬁcient n.a. n.a. 0.36 n.a.
Year ﬁxed effects Yes n.a. Yes Yes
Industry-time ﬁxed effect no Yes no no
Firm–industry–département ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels. Standard errors are corrected to take into account individual autocorrelation.
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The estimation of labour demand
Firm-level labour demand functions are usually estimated in the
literature thanks to dynamic models. Following Girma et al. (2007),
we estimate the following log-linearized empirical model:
lit = αlit−1 + βyit + βwit + εit ð9Þ
where lit is labour demand, yit is value-added and wit is the average
wage of ﬁrm i at time t. We consider that ﬁrms are price-taker for
wages, which seems to be a reasonable assumption given the low
degree of variability of average wage across ﬁrms. For symmetric
reasons to those mentioned about the estimation of production
functions, and for technical aspects of the estimation of dynamic
models, lit−1 and yit are endogenous. Here again, we consequently use
a GMM approach on ﬁrst-differenced variables instrumented by their
level at time t-2. All the coefﬁcients have the expected sign (the
current number of employees in a ﬁrm is positively affected by past
level of employment and by current level of activity and negatively
affected by current average wage) and the results are coherent with
the literature.
We calculate the residuals of that regression and we use them to
assess the impact of the LPS policy on ﬁrms' employment, once “core”
determinants of employment have been taken into account.
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